The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring by Roger H. Gordon
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, The
Volume Author/Editor: Olivier Blanchard, Kenneth Froot, Jeffrey Sachs,
eds.
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-05662-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/blan94-3
Conference Date: February 26-29, 1992
Publication Date: January 1994
Chapter Title: Fiscal Policy during the Transition in Eastern Europe
Chapter Author: Roger H. Gordon
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6721
Chapter pages in book: (p. 37 - 70)9  Fiscal Policy during the 
Transition in Eastern Europe 
Roger H. Gordon 
The transition in Eastern Europe from centrally planned to market economies 
inevitably will be a complex  and lengthy process.  Virtually  every aspect of 
these economies will need to change, and at every stage in the process fiscal 
policy will be a major concern. Several of the East European countries started 
the transition process gith large government deficits and rapid inflation. Rai- 
sing government revenue and reducing expenditures in order to eliminate these 
deficits have therefore been immediate priorities in reform efforts. The initial 
reform process has also involved a substantial relaxation of direct government 
control over the allocation of resources, allowing firms, individuals, and local 
governments to respond to prices rather than directives from the central gov- 
ernment. As a result, distortions to the incentives faced by these units created 
by national tax and regulatory policies suddenly mattered, and these distortions 
were often severe-the  inherited tax systems differed dramatically from those 
prevailing  in  market  economies. In  addition,  whereas  the government pre- 
viously maintained direct control over trade patterns, economic reform at least 
in Poland involved an immediate opening of the border to private trade. As a 
result, tax and regulatory distortions to trade patterns suddenly started to mat- 
ter as well.' 
Privatization inevitably occurs more slowly during the process of reform, 
but  it is essential for a successful  transition.  If firms  are sold, the result  is 
immediate revenue for the government and an  immediate drop in nonstate 
funds available for investment. Privatization also means that the government 
loses dividends from privatized firms in the future. The resulting changes in 
The author thanks Olivier Blanchard, Barry Bosworth, George Kopits, Michelle White, and 
conference participants for comments on an earlier draft, Annette Brown for research assistance, 
and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson for sending data on the Polish economy. 
1. Because of these distortions, Czechoslovakia felt obliged to close its borders prior to price 
reform, in order to stop the outflow of subsidized goods. 
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the time pattern of government revenue will require continual readjustments in 
fiscal policy. 
Throughout the reform process, there will be many new demands for govern- 
ment subsidies and expenditures. The newly unemployed hope for support pay- 
ments; struggling firms and farms hope for subsidies, cheap credit, and trade 
protection; the need to invest in infrastructure is enormous; the rise in inequal- 
ity creates demands for redistribution; etc. Yet  the taxes needed to finance 
these expenditures may be so high as to stifle economic development. 
In this paper, I try to provide an overview of  the fiscal pressures on East 
European governments during the transition  and  what  responses might  be 
called for. In each case, I start by describing the conventional wisdom concern- 
ing how best to deal with such pressures in a developed market economy. East 
European countries are not developed market economies, however, so I will 
also discuss the implications of various idiosyncratic features of these econo- 
mies for fiscal policy. Given the lack of experience and research on economies 
undergoing such an economic transition, these latter arguments are inevitably 
somewhat speculative. 
9.1  Fiscal Policy prior to the Reforms 
In the past, the tax systems in Eastern Europe resembled those in market 
economies, at least superficially. Table 9.1, taken from Mihaljek (1991), de- 
scribes the revenue flows reported from the major forms of  taxes. The East 
European governments collected 43.2 percent of GDP in explicit tax revenue 
on average, compared with an average figure of 38.1 percent of  GDP in the 
OECD countries. The composition of this revenue was quite different, how- 
ever. Profits taxes played a much more important role in Eastern Europe, while 
personal income taxes were much less important. 
Profits taxes in Eastern Europe differed in fundamental ways from those in 
use in OECD countries. To begin with, statutory tax rates were much higher- 
in Poland prior to the reforms, for example, the tax rate was 65 percent, while 
in Czechoslovakia it was 75 percent. In addition, firms did not necessarily have 
the right to retain their depreciation allowances, and a firm’s assets were often 
subject to separate taxes.2  More important, the government was free to modify 
a firm’s tax obligations ex post, with the result that the explicit tax rules were 
of little substantive importance. Furthermore, after-tax profits could simply be 
taken by the government, and as a rule losses would be covered in full by the 
government. Even if  some profits remained with the firms after taxes, firms 
were not free to spend these funds without approval of government ministries; 
if approval for expenditures was obtained, financing came with it.3 
2. Hungary and Poland imposed a tax on the balance sheet value of fixed assets. For further 
3. This financing could take the form of  low-interest loans, cheap prices for capital and other 
details, see Gray (1990). 
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Average  28.1  12.3  28.4  6.4  19.6  43.2 
OECD  7.9  31.8  30.2  -  24.4  38.1 
LDCsb  41.4  38.8  15.1  -  - 
Source: Mihaljek (1991). 
“1988. 
bunweighted average for 12 middle-income LDCs, 1985. 
Without explicit government controls on the allocation of  resources, these 
high implicit tax rates would have created overwhelming distortions to alloca- 
tion decisions. Allocation decisions were made primarily by  government min- 
istries, however. The government simply assigned inputs to firms and ordered 
the delivery of particular outputs. Prices for each were set by the government. 
Firms were obliged in principle to fulfill the production plans ordered by  the 
government, even if  doing so resulted in a loss in financial profits. In  sum, 
taxes served mainly an accounting role-direct  controls rather than taxes were 
the primary means used for allocating resources. 
Taxes could still have some indirect effects on allocation decisions. While 
these decisions were made primarily by government ministries, they would be 
based on information conveyed to these ministries by  firms. Firms could at- 
tempt to manipulate these decisions in response to the implicit incentives they 
faced. In addition, firms could control the degree to which they in fact fulfilled 
the production plans ordered by  the government. While tax distortions could 
therefore still have some net effect on allocation decisions, the nature of these 
effects was far different from those that would arise in market economies. 
Not only did taxes have only indirect effects on the allocation of resources, 
but they also had little effect on the distribution of  income. While personal 
income taxes did not normally exist, the government could still tax workers 
indirectly through ordering a reduction in wages, through raising the prices of 
consumer goods, or simply through reducing production of consumer goods, 
with queues or explicit rationing used to absorb the increased scarcity. Simi- 
larly, interest rates were set extremely low, implicitly creating very high taxes 
on financial savings but subsidies for firms receiving credit. The government 
controlled firm profits not only through the tax law and the allocation of cheap 
credit but also through its control over output and input prices. 40  Roger H. Gordon 
Since the government controlled the allocation of resources directly, taxes 
were not even the primary means of collecting revenue for government opera- 
tions. The government could simply order the delivery of goods, paying for 
them at prices far below their market value. These goods were often then resold 
at quite different prices, generating trading profits or losses, depending on the 
government’s objectives. Many of  these implicit taxes and subsidies are not 
even reported in the accounts of government revenues and expenditures. Since 
firms were state owned, the separation between the government’s budget and 
firm budgets was of little importance  in any case. In sum, given the limited 
role of the tax system prior to the reforms, the tax law could and did take a form 
entirely incompatible  with the successful functioning  of  a market economy. 
9.2  Effect of the Reforms on Government Revenues and Expenditures 
With economic reform, allocation decisions are no longer made directly by 
government ministries; instead, they are made by firms, individuals, and local 
governments. Prices, wages, and to some degree interest rates and exchange 
rates are set by market forces rather than by the government. This reform pro- 
cess will have fundamental and pervasive effects on the allocation of resources 
and the distribution of income. This section focuses on the implications  for 
government revenues and expenditures. 
9.2.1  Effect on Government Revenues 
The reform process has both immediate and long-lasting effects on govern- 
ment revenue. To begin with, the immediate jump in prices when prices are 
decontrolled  and the likely continuing  inflation have complicated effects on 
reported  profits and business income-tax payments, even if  real activity and 
the tax law were to remain  unchanged. The immediate jump in prices raises 
firms’ revenue but does not affect many of the firms’ deductions. For example, 
depreciation deductions, deductions for goods taken out of inventory, and in- 
terest deductions are all tied in the very short run to the low prices that pre- 
vailed prior to the reforms. The result is an immediate jump in taxable profits 
and in profits-tax payments, with the result that firms at first appear far more 
profitable than they really are. Poland’s recent experience illustrates this. The 
reported average profit rate of Polish firms jumped from 19 percent in 1988 to 
45.5 percent in 1989, the year of Poland’s explosive rise in prices. Profits con- 
tinued at the relatively high level of 29.4 percent in 1990, in spite of the sharp 
recession  in Poland during that year.4 Eventually, however, the high nominal 
interest rates required to compensate for inflation led to an understatement of 
4. These figures, taken from table  1 in  the  1991 Statistical Bulletin published by the Polish 
Ministry of Finance, measure the ratio of  accounting profits to accounting costs, as defined under 
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true profits, as nominal interest payments were deducted from real  income^.^ 
As a result, the reported average profit rate fell to 8.3 percent during the first 
three months of 1991 and should continue to fall further. 
As seen in table 9.2, Poland’s business income-tax revenue  in real terms 
followed a similar time path, growing moderately in both  1989 and  1990, but 
then collapsing during the first eight months of  199  1  .6  This collapse in income 
taxes in  1991 almost entirely explains the sharp fall in aggregate government 
tax revenue that occurred in 199  1. 
Inflation-induced  biases in the measurement of profits are not the only ex- 
planation for this collapse in business income-tax revenues. The recession that 
began with the initiation of  reforms in  1990 certainly caused true profits to 
fall.’ In addition, with the reforms firms acquired the ability to alter their deci- 
sions so as to reduce their tax liabilities. For example, heavily taxed state firms 
could  set up lightly taxed private  “subsidiaries” (or joint ventures)  and shift 
their taxable profits to these lightly taxed firms through use of transfer prices. 
If  sidewalk vendors are more lightly taxed than businesses operating out of a 
storefront, commerce can and has simply moved onto the sidewalk. Tax eva- 
sion will also become much more of a problem under the reforms. With the 
decentralization of prices and decision making, auditing of firms becomes far 
more difficult.  Financial records will be  inadequate,  in part because  use of 
financial intermediaries is limited, which eliminates an independent source of 
information. In addition, there are not yet enough trained accountants (or ac- 
counting  standards) to provide  any effective oversight.  When prices  are  so 
much in flux, it is even difficult to judge the plausibility of reported transac- 
tions. 
Firms also have an incentive to increase their wage payments, resulting in a 
fall in taxable income. Prior to the reforms, wage rates were very low, particu- 
larly for skilled workers, owing to implicit taxes on these workers. With the 
end of direct controls over wages, firms are under competitive pressure to raise 
wages to market levels.* Poland has attempted to prevent this jump in wages 
5. Inflation creates other biases in accounting measures of profits that cause profits to be over- 
stated since depreciation and inventory deductions are  based on historic cost. Gordon (1984) 
shows that, even at US.  inflation rates, inflation causes on net a reduction in taxable profits. 
6. Nominal figures for tax revenue come from the 1991 Statistical Yearbook, supplemented by 
figures for 1991 from the Stutistical  Bulletins in  1991. Income-tax revenues were defined to in- 
clude dividends received by  the government from state enterprises. These figures were deflated 
using a price index for industrial production, constructed from data in the Statistical Bulletins. In 
particular, the annual data for each year are deflated back to June  1988 using an average of the 
monthly price indices  in  each year. (These deflators equaled  1.005 for  1988, 3.252 for  1989, 
23.208 for 1990, and 32.900 for the first eight months of 199  1 .) These deflated figures undoubtedly 
overstate real revenue, particularly in  1989, since they assume a constant real flow of revenue, 
whereas firms often postponed tax payments in order to make them with a deflated currency. 
7. Initial drops in output under the reforms have been substantial. For example, industrial pro- 
duction in the state sector in Poland fell by 25 percent in  1990, compared with the previous year. 
8. In fact, state firms acting in the interests of their workers should be willing to raise wages 
above workers’ marginal products. 42  Roger H. Gordon 
Table 9.2  Real Government Revenues and Expenditures in Poland, 
1988-August  1991, (trillions of Dec. 1988 zloty) 
1988  1989  1990  1991  :  1-8 
Revenues 
Total 






































































Note: N.A. = not available. 
through high taxes on “excess” wage payments.  These conflicting  pressures 
have resulted in sharp fluctuations in reported real wages during the transition 
period to date.9 
The economic reforms also have important implications for revenue from 
the  turnover tax. The shift from controlled  to market prices causes a price 
jump. But revenue from the turnover tax should not change in real terms as a 
result if this revenue is deflated using the actual prices at the stage where the 
tax is collected. This is true only for ad valorem  taxes, which collect some 
percentage of sales revenue, however. Some turnover taxes, primarily those on 
alcohol, were ad rem, and these payments remain fixed in nominal terms and 
therefore fall in real terms owing to inflation. In addition, revenues fall when 
production drops. As seen in table 9.2, turnover tax revenues  in Poland fell 
moderately in 1989 but then dropped dramatically in 1990.’O 
The relative growth of  the private  sector should also result in a fall in tax 
revenue relative to GDP. Collecting revenue from private firms is difficult since 
9. According to the data in the Stutisticul  Bulletin, if  wages in  1988 equaled  100, then real 
monthly wages in trade were 120 in 1989, dropped to 82 in 1990, but jumped back to 122 during 
the first eight months of 1991. These figures ignore many forms of  supplementary payments made 
to workers both in kind and through parallel private firms. 
10. The drop in tax revenue from beer and alcohol explains roughly 40 percent of this overall 
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their activity is very hard to monitor. Whatever mechanisms did exist for moni- 
toring private firms prior to the reforms were substantially weakened as part of 
the attempt to eliminate the barriers restricting private activity.''  In part be- 
cause of the inadequate financial sectors in these countries, private businesses 
are likely to operate primarily through cash transactions, making auditing ex- 
tremely difficult. At least to begin with, effective tax rates on these firms are 
likely to be much lower than those on state firms, regardless of  the relative 
statutory tax rates. As seen in table 9.2, tax revenue from the private and house- 
hold sectors has always been small, and it shrank after the reforms started in 
spite of the entry of thousands of new private firms. 
A basic part of the reforms has inevitably been a reduction in both profits 
and turnover-tax rates, in order to lessen the efficiency losses resulting from 
tax distortions. The resulting direct loss in tax revenue only adds to the losses 
that would have occurred in any case. 
All these factors lead to a reduction in tax revenue. Decentralized allocation 
decisions should result in an increase in efficiency, however, and part of this 
increase will go to the government in increased tax revenue. Many of  these 
effects can occur very quickly. For example, allocating goods among consum- 
ers on the basis of cash sales rather than queues results in an efficiency gain 
and extra revenue. The increased interest rates paid on bank deposits should 
induce individuals to put their savings in banks rather than continuing to hoard 
foreign currency or stockpile real commodities. Unlike other forms of savings, 
bank  deposits free resources  for productive investment, generating an  effi- 
ciency gain and additional tax revenue. While efficiency gains raise the abso- 
lute size of  tax revenue, however, they should not have much effect on the 
share of tax revenue in GDP. 
The net effects of  all these pressures on tax revenue can be substantial. In 
China, where we have ten years of information on the reform effort, govern- 
ment revenue fell steadily from 34.4 percent of GNP in 1978 to 20.4 percent 
in  1988,'* for many of  the reasons described above. Unless their tax policies 
change dramatically, governments in Eastern Europe should forecast a steady 
decline in their tax revenues as a fraction of GDP. 
9.2.2  Effect on Government Expenditures 
The likely drop in government revenues that results from reform will create 
substantial macroeconomic pressures unless the reforms also cause a compara- 
ble fall in government expenditures. The reforms are likely to cause govern- 
ment expenditures to fall for a variety of reasons, although not necessarily at 
the same time or to the same extent as the fall in government revenue. 
The initial reform process should involve a cut in subsidies to both consum- 
11. For example, prior to the reforms, Polish farmers could sell only to a state marketing agency, 
12. For further discussion and documentation, see Blejer and Szapary (1990). 
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ers and firms, in order to improve the incentives that these groups face when 
making allocation decisions. As seen in table 9.2, the drop in subsidies to firms 
in Poland was quick and dramatic; the drop in subsidies to the household sector 
was also dramatic, although it occurred more slowly. This cut in subsidies in 
Poland was complicated  by  the increasing  importance  of  loss-making  firms 
resulting  from the recession.  While the government  no longer  covers their 
losses directly, the government-controlled  banking  system may well  support 
these firms through extending further credit that is unlikely to be repaid, simply 
shifting the subsidies to another part of the government's budget. Documenting 
the extent of any such subsidies is difficult." 
Government-financed investment expenditures should also drop under the 
reforms. Previously,  the government financed essentially  all new  investment 
out of government revenue. Under the reforms, investment will be increasingly 
financed by firms out of their retained earnings or by the banking system using 
household deposits, allowing the government to reduce its investment expendi- 
tures.I4 As seen in table 9.2, government-financed investment in Poland has in 
fact been falling quickly. 
Other factors lead to increased demands for government expenditures, how- 
ever. To begin  with, governments can no longer order delivery  of  goods at 
below-market prices-even  if revenue as a percentage  of GDP remains un- 
changed, the resources that these funds can buy may be sharply diminished. In 
addition, the reforms have been accompanied by a sharp growth in unemploy- 
ment and therefore in expenditures on unemployment and other social insur- 
ance  benefit^.'^ 
In the intermediate term, privatization will have important implications for 
government revenue. The government may receive revenue initially if it sells 
ownership rights rather than giving them away, but in the future it loses the 
stream of dividend payments from privatized firms.lh The result can be sharp 
fluctuations over time in government receipts. 
On net, the government deficit in Poland has fluctuated substantially during 
this period. It grew substantially during the inflation in 1989, as subsidies rose 
to maintain various prices at their historical values, in spite of the inflation. 
The initial reform package intentionally cut expenditures by enough to result 
in a net surplus, so as to stop this inflation. But in the resulting recession a 
large deficit has again reappeared and is growing quickly. 
13. Net reported government revenue from the financial sector increased under the reforms, 
owing presumably to the sharp increase in the spread between borrowing and lending rates. Bad 
debts will show up in the accounts only when default occurs. 
14. In China, investment as a fraction of GDP held steady under the reforms in spite of a sharp 
drop in explicit government financing. For further discussion, see Naughton (1988). 
15. Prior to the reforms, unemployment was avoided by  forcing firms to hire otherwise unem- 
ployed individuals. As a result, unemployment benefits previously showed up in the budget in the 
form of reduced profits of state firms. Now they are reported directly. 
16. For an extended discussion of the revenue and macroeconomic effects of the privatization 
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9.3  Macroeconomic Fiscal Policy during the Reforms 
Given these fluctuations in the government deficit that inevitably accompany 
the reform effort, preventing  future inflation (or deflation)  will be a serious 
challenge. Yet inflation is likely to be much more costly in these countries than 
it would be in developed market economies. Decentralized decision making 
requires a price system in which prices accurately and clearly convey the value 
of each good and service. Inflation inevitably erodes the information conveyed 
by prices. The East European countries have not begun to develop the institu- 
tions that exist in the West to lessen the costs created by inflation. Even such 
basic responses as penalties for late payments often do not exist. Many prices, 
for example, interest rates, do not yet respond quickly and flexibly to market 
pressures, with the result that inflation can quickly lead to rationing and even 
to trade outside established institutions, in order to avoid price  restriction^.^' 
One major cost of inflation is that it makes accounting information about firm 
profitability very misleading, for reasons described above. The misleading ac- 
counting information makes allocation of credit much more difficult, it makes 
the firm's own analysis of investment opportunities difficult, and it leads to tax 
payments that have little or no relation to economic profits, creating larger and 
more pervasive distortions to incentives than would occur without inflation.'* 
On net, tax revenue is likely to fall substantially owing to inflation.lg Stabiliz- 
ing market prices  should therefore be a key priority  at the beginning  of  the 
reform process, as it was in Poland. 
Put simply, stopping inflation requires stopping the (excessive) printing of 
money, thus bringing government cash flow back into balance. East European 
governments are now under immense political pressure to raise expenditures. 
To avoid inflation, they are therefore under immense pressure as well to raise 
financing for these expenditures through some means. The alternatives are rai- 
sing taxes or borrowing either at home or abroad. Given the low initial tax base 
and high initial tax rates, raising taxes will be very difficult without a major 
reform of the tax system. Such tax reforms take time. Without a tax reform, 
higher business income-tax rates at the beginning of the reform process will 
sharply discourage new investment, particularly in the private sector, where 
investors are committing their own funds, thereby undermining one of the key 
17. Uncertainty concerning future inflation rates also makes bonds paying a nominally fixed 
interest rate very risky. To  lessen this risk, bonds could pay a floating interest rate, with frequent 
revisions in the interest rate. Indexed bonds are another alternative, but this option would be much 
more complicated given the difficulty of creating a reasonable price index in the face of rapidly 
changing relative prices and consumption bundles. Another option is to issue bonds denominated 
in a more stable currency, although this still imposes exchange rate risk on purchasers. 
18. For further discussion, see Auerbach (1988). 
19. Double-digit inflation rates can undermine a conventional income-tax system, as nominal 
interest deductions overwhelm real profits of firms. Even in the United States, Gordon and Slem- 
rod (1988) found that nominal interest deductions were large enough to more than wipe out all 
tax revenue from the return to capital. 46  Roger H. Gordon 
objectives of the reform process. This occurs not only because the high tax 
distortions reduce after-tax earnings on new investments but also because high 
tax payments  (including payments to the government for firms being privat- 
ized) reduce current consumption relative to future consumption. These factors 
raise the implicit rate of return that new investments must earn to be attractive. 
High tax rates also exacerbate the inevitable distortions created by the mismea- 
surement of economic income and by differences in effective tax rates by in- 
dustry or commodity. 
Balancing the government budget period by period through changes in tax 
rates would also require large short-term fluctuations in these rates, in order to 
avoid large short-term fluctuations in money creation and therefore in prices. 
Selling off state-owned firms, for example, results in a one-time jump in reve- 
nue,  owing to the sale. But these fluctuations  in tax rates can create severe 
distortions in their own right. Unexpected fluctuations in these tax rates make 
new investment more risky  and lead to costly attempts to shift income and 
deductions across time to minimize tax payments. Once rates are clearly ex- 
pected to fall, however, taxes make new investment unusually attractive since 
the start-up expenses can be deducted at the initially high tax rates while the 
income from the investment will be taxed at the lower rates expected to prevail 
in the future. All these responses reduce taxable income when rates are high 
and increase it when rates are low, forcing even larger fluctuations in tax rates 
to maintain budget balance period by period, which further distorts economic 
incentives. 
As Barro (1979) has argued, efficiency argues for stable tax rates, with the 
level of  rates set so that the government's budget is balanced only in present 
value rather  than period by period. This calls for borrowing to smooth out 
temporary differences between revenues and expenditures. In the East Euro- 
pean context, this policy requires that governments  borrow  during the early 
years of the reform process when fiscal pressures are great and pay back these 
loans in the future. In principle, the government could borrow either at home 
or abroad. But borrowing at home undoubtedly crowds out loans to finance 
business investment and business restructuring. As a result, this borrowing di- 
rectly slows the transition process and so is also very costly. 
This leaves the alternative of borrowing  from abroad. Standard theory ar- 
gues that a country that is small relative to the world capital market should 
borrow from abroad (or lend abroad) until the domestic interest rate equals that 
prevailing in the world market (after correcting for the effects of  anticipated 
exchange rate changes).zn  Given the initially low rate of private savings in many 
of these countries and the many demands for capital, this would imply substan- 
tial capital flows from abroad. 
20. Of course, the demand for capital by  the East European countries, and particularly by the 
Soviet Union, will be substantial, so technically the optimal level of borrowing may be somewhat 
smaller, to avoid driving up the interest rates they face. For a formal analysis, see Gordon and 
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But most of the East European governments are already heavily in debt to 
foreign lenders. Given the resulting risk of default, they will find it very diffi- 
cult to borrow yet more from abroad. Of course, if individuals and firms could 
borrow from abroad, the government could then borrow on the domestic mar- 
ket.  These capital  flows  from abroad  could  take the  form of  loans  from 
branches of foreign banks to individuals or firms or of corporate direct invest- 
ment in new or existing firms. So far, however, such capital flows from abroad 
have also been very limited. Many explanations might be given. Foreigners 
find it very difficult to screen loan applicants, they rarely find effective collat- 
eral available for these loans, and they can have little confidence in how the 
legal system will end up dealing with loan defaults and individual or firm bank- 
ruptcies. Corporate direct investors face not just the fundamental uncertainty 
concerning which industries, firms, and managers will be successful but also 
uncertainty concerning future government policy. To what degree will the gov- 
ernment support union pressure on foreign-owned firms, change the tax law 
in adverse ways, impose restrictions on competition  with domestic firms or 
conversion of currencies, etc.? Even if the government seems committed now 
to maintaining a favorable business climate for foreign direct investment, these 
policies are time inconsistent-the  new businesses will be an attractive source 
of tax revenue in the future. Given the large overhang of foreign debt inherited 
from past policies, this threat of high future taxes should be of real concern. 
Anticipating the possibility of adverse policy changes, potential entrants have 
a strong incentive to wait until the uncertainties have been reduced before com- 
mitting funds or at least to focus primarily on very short-term  projects. But 
these delays slow down the recovery process and undermine the reform effort.*’ 
One way  to reduce  these uncertainties  is for Western  countries  to make 
credit conditional on adoption and maintenance of government  policies that 
are conducive to economic growth. Only international organizations such as 
the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development or for- 
eign governments  are in a position to impose  such conditions  and credibly 
commit to imposing “punishments”  on a country  that does not meet them. 
These implicit threats are actually in the interests of the borrowing countries 
since they increase the credibility of government promises concerning future 
policy.  As  a  result,  foreign  investors  should  have  less  fear  about  adverse 
changes in policy, making investing in the countries more attractive. One es- 
sential step in reassuring investors concerning the possibility of adverse policy 
changes is to set up a tax structure and tax rates that will raise sufficient reve- 
nue to balance the government’s budget in present value, given its budgetary 
commitments, without requiring future changes in tax rates. 
Therefore, a major tax reform may be essential quickly, even if  short-term 
government financing will come from foreign loans. Since relying primarily 
on foreign loans to help finance current expenditure needs seems unrealistic, 
21. For one attempt to model this process more formally, see Laban and Wolf (1991). 48  Roger H. Gordon 
the pressure is that much greater to reform the tax system immediately, to en- 
able the government to finance current expenditures through additional taxes, 
without unduly distorting the allocation of resources. 
9.4  What Changes in the Tax Structure Are Most Urgent? 
In the past, effective turnover and business income-tax rates in Eastern Eu- 
rope were very high. In addition, the government often intervened ex post to 
alter the net tax payments, covering the losses of some firms and expropriating 
excess cash reserves of others, raising effective tax rates yet further. Given the 
past government controls over firm behavior, firms were not in much of a posi- 
tion to react to the resulting tax distortions, which limited their consequences. 
With the reforms, however, decision making is being decentralized. These tax 
distortions are large enough to alter allocation decisions substantially, impos- 
ing large excess burdens on the economy. The result is substantial pressure to 
reduce tax rates. There is also substantial pressure, however, to raise more reve- 
nue quickly. The only way to accomplish both is to broaden the tax base con- 
siderably. The problem is how to do this quickly. 
Initial reforms will be constrained by what can feasibly be implemented in 
a short time period. Tax reform is always a complex and time-consuming pro- 
cess. Inevitably, the solution will be a sequence of tax reforms, starting with 
what can be done quickly, and evolving toward a tax  system that would  be 
preferred in the long run. In designing a sequence of tax reforms, however, it 
is important to minimize the windfall gains and losses that occur during later 
steps in the reform process. To begin with, large windfall losses create strong 
political constituencies that oppose the reforms. Grandfathering past decisions 
to lessen these windfalls,  however, greatly  complicates  further reforms  and 
slows the reform process. In addition, individuals will attempt to anticipate 
ex ante the possibility of  such windfalls and alter their behavior accordingly. 
Therefore,  if tax changes that  create windfalls  will  be essential  in the near 
future, then the actual distortions created by the sequence of tax structures may 
be quite different than they would appear simply analyzing the tax statutes at 
any date. In discussing immediate reform needs, I therefore  discuss as well 
what further reforms should follow. 
9.4.1 
Traditionally in these countries,  turnover-tax rates  varied  dramatically  by 
good. There were several hundred if not several thousand different turnover- 
tax rates, allowing the government to set consumer prices that prevented undue 
rationing while maintaining producer prices at arbitrary values. Once produc- 
tion  decisions are decentralized,  however, these differences  in  tax  rates  by 
good create severe distortions to both the pattern of production and the pattern 
of trade and make enforcement far more complicated. Also, collecting tax on 
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output rather than  on value added creates an artificial incentive to integrate 
vertically in order to avoid turnover taxes on purchased inputs. 
Reforming this traditional system of turnover-tax rates is probably the high- 
est priority in tax reform (and one that was often undertaken well before the 
current wave of reforms). To begin  with, the range of tax rates needs to be 
narrowed substantially both by good and by firm. Poland, for example, moved 
very quickly toward equalizing turnover-tax rates, and the same should be done 
quickly in all these countries. Complete equalization of rates would make ad- 
ministration of the system easiest. While some rate variation may be desirable 
on equity grounds, it would be best to start with a uniform rate and then intro- 
duce rate variation if appropriate at a later date when the tax administration is 
in a position to enforce it. 
In the past, turnover taxes were imposed on domestic production. In prin- 
ciple, no tax was due when goods were exported, but tax was due on imported 
goods. Maintaining such border corrections is essential, once tariff and nontar- 
iff barriers to trade are reduced as part of the reform effort. Any difference in 
the taxes on imported versus domestically produced goods or any unrebated 
taxes on exports create incentives to import goods that are taxed more heavily 
if produced at home and export goods that are relatively subsidized.22  Given 
that the effective turnover-tax rate on a good depends on the degree to which 
intermediate goods are traded between taxed firms and the degree to which 
production takes place in firms subject to the tax, differences in effective tax 
rates can easily become important. Any remaining differences in the effective 
tax rates should be eliminated in the early stages of the reform process. Once 
industries develop in response to these distortions, eliminating them will be- 
come far more 
More time consuming will be reform of the basic structure of the tax. In the 
past, turnover taxes were normally imposed at a single stage in the production 
process, when firms involved in manufacturing sold to customers outside the 
manufacturing sector. As a result, there was an incentive to shift activity to the 
retail sector in order to avoid these taxes. Under this traditional  system, it is 
difficult to determine the appropriate rebate when  goods are exported since 
there is no information concerning taxes previously paid on inputs purchased 
by the firm. There are two alternative directions to go in reforming the system. 
One would be to shift to a tax only on sales to final consumers, as is done with 
U.S. sales taxes; the other is to shift to a value-added tax (VAT), as is used in 
22. Only relative tax distortions matter here-if  the effective surtax rates on domestically vs. 
foreign-produced goods were all equal, then the exchange rate would simply adjust to offset this 
distortion. 
23. One problem faced, however, is evasion of the tax on imports by small traders, encouraging 
excessive entry into commercial activity by  such traders. One response, other than tightening the 
controls on the border yet further, is to  impose a presumptive tax in the form of a license fee to 
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Western Europe. In theory, the two approaches are completely equivalent. The 
latter approach has many administrative advantages, however. For one, enforc- 
ing tax collection  is much easier at the production  stage, where there are a 
few large firms, than at the retail stage, where there are many small firms and 
individual traders. Under a VAT,  tax is collected at each stage, with the result 
that evasion at the retail level implies loss of revenue on only the value added 
at that last stage rather than loss of the entire revenue. In addition, at earlier 
stages in production, the European-style VAT is almost self-enforcing. In order 
to document a rebate for value-added  taxes previously  paid  on inputs pur- 
chased, a firm needs to provide an invoice proving that value-added taxes have 
been  collected,  and how  much,  on the goods purchased.  If  taxes had been 
evaded on this sale, then the rebate would be disallowed to the purchaser; eva- 
sion therefore has no net effect on tax revenue. Furthermore, it would be much 
easier to move from the existing system to a VAT  than to a retail sales tax. 
Currently, primarily firms involved in production are subject to turnover taxes. 
The first step in a transition to a VAT could involve taxing all firms involved in 
production and then granting rebates to these firms for turnover taxes paid on 
inputs that they purchase from other such firms, a step that should take only a 
year or so to organize. More difficult will be to extend the coverage of the tax 
to firms in the commercial and retail sectors. Far more firms would be involved, 
and each firm is far smaller and harder to monitor. In Poland, small firms rely 
heavily on cash transactions and keep poor records. Adequate enforcement of 
a tax on these firms may have to wait until cash transactions have been replaced 
by use of the banking system, allowing accounting and tax auditing to focus 
on bank records.  Presumptive taxes (e.g., license fees or surtaxes on inputs 
they purchase) might be used instead. 
9.4.2  Reform of the Profits Tax 
Explicit taxes on business income are a major source of government revenue 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,  much more so than  in the OECD 
countries. At least until very recently, average tax rates were extremely high. 
The economic reforms now give firms much more discretion over their actions 
and eliminate the  offsetting  subsidies that previously  made the investment 
projects chosen by  the government profitable. As a result, existing tax distor- 
tions will become far more costly  than they  had been  previously,  inducing 
firms to change their behavior so as to reduce their tax liabilities. 
The most immediate problem that needs to be dealt with is the effect of the 
high inflation rates and rapid relative price changes in many of these countries 
on the tax base used for the business income tax. As in most countries, inflation 
has dramatic effects on the measure of taxable income, holding real income 
constant. Nominal rather than real interest payments are deductible, deprecia- 
tion deductions are based on historic costs of capital equipment rather than 
replacement costs, and deductions for use of materials  are based on historic 
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Inflationary  effects on measured income can easily overwhelm real factors, 
given the range of inflation rates seen in these countries. For example, as noted 
above, reported profits for firms in Poland rose dramatically during 1989 and 
continued to be high in 1990 in spite of the economic slump that followed the 
initiation of the economic reforms. The explanation is simply that the tenfold 
increase in prices during 1989 virtually wiped out interest, depreciation, and 
material expense deductions for these firms, all leading to a sharp increase in 
measured profits. Yet the continuing inflation is likely now leading to a sharp 
downward bias in measured profits since deductions for the high nominal inter- 
est payments offset any taxable profits being earned by these firms.24 
These sharp fluctuations in taxable profits not only imply sharp fluctuations 
in the government budget but also create substantial distortions to investment 
incentives. Correcting the definition of taxable income for inflation and relative 
price changes, however, would add substantial complexity to the tax code. The 
cost of this  complexity is high enough that even OECD countries have not 
adopted such  correction^.^^ A simpler solution is to shift to a different defini- 
tion of  taxable income that is not vulnerable to these effects of inflation. A 
value-added tax base, for example, measures all flows using current rather than 
past prices and is therefore not vulnerable to the effects of inflation. While 
other alternatives would be available, moving toward a value-added tax base 
would eventually allow both the turnover tax and the profits tax to be replaced 
primarily by a value-added tax, greatly simplifying the tax structure. 
The key changes in the definition of taxable income in order quickly to elim- 
inate the current vulnerability to inflation would be the following: 
1. Eliminate  the  taxatioddeductibility of  interest  income/puyments.  This 
would be the most critical change in the definition of taxable income. Under a 
conventional income tax, nominal interest payments are deductible, and nomi- 
nal interest income is taxable. If  interest payers and recipients face the same 
tax rate, and if the economy is closed, then net taxes collected remain the same 
if both interest deductions and the taxation of interest income are eliminated, 
as occurs with a VAT. Differences in tax rates, however, lead those in high tax 
brackets to borrow from those in low tax brackets, with the result that eliminat- 
ing  the  taxatioddeductibility  of  interest  leads  to  a jump in  tax  revenue. 
Avoiding the taxation of interest income in the future would also prevent any 
tax incentive to invest abroad in foreign bonds so as to avoid domestic taxes. 
24. Take, for example, the situation where capital is in fact earning a 15 percent taxable rate of 
return while the real interest rate is zero. Even if only 50 percent of new investment were financed 
by bank loans with a nominal interest rate of 30 percent, to compensate for a 30 percent inflation 
rate, reported profits would be zero. In fact, the nominal interest rate was higher than this in Poland 
in 1990, to compensate for the continuing high inflation rate, with the result that such a firm would 
report large losses. 
25. Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Israel have all attempted to correct their definitions of taxable 
business income for inflation, in response to their much higher inflation rates. These countries 
were in  a much better institutional position to handle the required sophistication in accounting 
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Given the physical proximity of the East European countries to West European 
financial markets and the number of East European families with friends and 
relatives abroad, the threat of capital flight is a very real one. 
2. Replace depreciation deductions with immediate deductions for new capi- 
tal purchases. If any deductions allowed for new investment can be taken im- 
mediately, then inflation does not deflate the value of these deductions.26  When 
capital purchases are allowed as a deduction in full and interest payments are 
not, as under a VAT, then no taxes are collected in present value on marginal 
investments, and investment decisions are undistorted. The government simply 
pays a fraction of any expenses of new investment equal to the tax rate and 
collects that fraction of the income derived from the investment. If the investor 
breaks even in present value, so does the government. The government does 
tax any above-marginal returns on new investments and taxes the gross returns 
from existing capital.27  Allowing a smaller initial deduction, as proposed  in 
Auerbach (1980),  does result in a net tax discouraging capital investment, but 
one whose value is still unaffected by inflation. In theory, a small open econ- 
omy should invest until the marginal product of new investment equals the cost 
of  funds on the world  capital  market, even given  the need  to raise revenue 
through distorting taxes.**  Allowing a full deduction for the purchase price of 
new investment results in the desired level of investment and corresponds to 
the tax treatment of new investment under a VAT. 
3. Deduct materials when purchased rather than when used. Similarly, if the 
amount spent on purchases of materials is deductible and sales revenue is tax- 
able at the same rate, then there is no distortion to marginal investments in 
inventories.  If,  instead,  a deduction  is allowed only when the materials  are 
used, then the nominal return from investing in  inventories is subject to tax, 
causing inflation to raise effective tax rates. For the same reason that a small 
open economy should not discourage investment in capital, however, it should 
not discourage investment  in inventories. Again, the tax treatment under the 
VAT  achieves the desired outcome. 
On  net,  these  changes are likely  to broaden  the tax  base  substantially, 
allowing the government to raise more revenue while reducing tax distortions. 
Using U.S. data for 1983, Gordon and Slemrod (1988) found that introducing 
the changes outlined above under both the corporate and the personal income 
tax systems would result in a net increase in tax revenue. This occurred because 
the  revenue gained by  eliminating  interest  deductions more  than  offset the 
26. At high enough inflation rates, postponement of tax payments within the tax year can sub- 
stantially reduce real tax payments. This was a serious problem in Poland during 1989. Avoiding 
it requires timely payment of taxes throughout the tax year. 
27. One transitional issue is whether to allow the continued depreciation of existing capital. 
Eliminating these deductions for existing capital imposes windfall losses on firms. Since most 
firms are owned by  the government, these windfalls should not be of  much policy concern. In 
Poland, at least, these deductions were largely wiped out in any case by the inflation in  1989. 
28. This result dates back at least to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). For further discussion, see 
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losses that arose from eliminating the taxation of interest income and shifting 
to the expensing of new in~estment.~~  Given the much higher inflation rates in 
most of the East European countries and the fact that they have not in the past 
taxed interest income, the revenue gain from these tax changes should be much 
more dramatic there. 
Any delay in introducing these changes will result in continued gyrations in 
tax revenue and misallocations of new investment. These proposed changes 
would  make the business tax  easier to administer30 while leaving  the  basic 
structure of the tax unchanged and should therefore not be complicated to in- 
troduce. One potential drawback to these changes, however, is that foreign in- 
vestors in the country may no longer be able to claim a credit for these tax 
payments against the income taxes that they owe in their home country because 
the tax looks like an indirect tax rather than an income tax. This is unlikely to 
be an important consideration at the current time. To begin with, a number of 
European  countries  (e.g.,  France  and  the  Netherlands)  do not  tax  foreign- 
source income and so do not grant credits for taxes paid abroad. Many firms 
based in the United  States have excess credits available already and so gain 
little from further credits. In any case, taxes are owed in the home country only 
when profits are repatriated, and repatriation can be postponed indefinitely. 
Another potential  problem with existing business taxes is that any differ- 
ences in effective tax rates by industry create trade distortions-imports  will 
be  encouraged  in  industries facing high effective tax  rates,  and conversely. 
Since small open economies should not distort trade patterns, they would gain 
by  eliminating the trade distortions created by a business income tax. Given 
the high business income-tax rates and the large number of tax-exempt sectors, 
these distortions are of dominant concern. As before, it is important to elimi- 
nate them before industries develop to take advantage of them. One approach 
is simply to choose the same effective tax rate in all industries. This is undoubt- 
edly infeasible, given the problems in taxing agriculture, the financial sector, 
services, etc. A simpler approach would be to exempt from tax the revenue 
from exports and to impose a tax on imports, as would occur under a VAT. 
The changes in the business income tax proposed above would not eliminate 
evasion by smaller firms. These firms engage heavily in cash transactions, par- 
ticularly given the primitive  state of the existing commercial banking sector, 
making enforcement virtually impossible. If the expected value added by these 
firms is roughly proportional to their inputs (e.g., retail sales are proportional 
to wholesale purchases), then one option is to impose a presumptive surtax on 
inputs purchased by these firms, at a rate reflecting the expected value added 
within the firm. In principle, small firms could have the option of  paying the 
29. On net, revenue went up even if  dividends and capital gains income were also made tax 
30. With these changes, no records need to be  kept over time concerning the prices paid for 
exempt. 
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presumptive tax or submitting to an approved audit and paying the resulting 
VAT obligation. 
9.4.3 
Given the important role of the personal income tax in other countries, it 
would be natural for East European countries to try to set up a personal income 
tax quickly as well. This probably should not be a major priority. Taxes im- 
posed on individuals are much more difficult and expensive to enforce than 
taxes on firms since so many more entities are involved. Since these taxes have 
not existed in the past, their introduction will be time consuming and compli- 
cated. What should be done in the meantime? How quickly should a personal 
income tax be introduced? 
The bulk of the tax base under a personal income tax is wages and salaries 
earned by workers.  Under a conventional  income-tax system, wages are de- 
ductible under the business income tax but then are taxable under the personal 
income tax. If the tax rates under the two taxes were the same, then eliminating 
the deductions for wage payments under the business income tax and not tax- 
ing wage income further at the individual level would be equivalent. Eliminat- 
ing the deductibility of wage payments under the business income tax is an 
easy change administratively and can be done far more quickly than introduc- 
ing a personal income tax. This explicit tax on labor income would replace the 
implicit tax that existed previously through direct controls on wage payments. 
This approach to taxing labor income is exactly that used under a VAT. 
An alternative advocated by McLure (1991), one that is not much more dif- 
ficult to administer, is to continue wage deductions under the business-level 
tax but to have businesses deduct a tax from each employee’s wage income. 
Under this alternative, labor income could be taxed at progressive rates, but all 
taxes would still be collected at the firm level. The extra complexity that this 
change involves may well seem appropriate on equity grounds in the long run, 
but it should probably be postponed in the short run, given the time needed 
to introduce such administrative procedures. Another drawback of McLure’s 
proposal is that the GATT rules may not allow border adjustments under his 
proposal, whereas they are allowed under a VAT. 
In addition to taxing wages and salaries, a conventional personal income tax 
would also attempt to tax income earned from savings. Prior to the reforms in 
these countries, financial savings were subject to virtually  confiscatory taxa- 
tion since the only available forms of financial savings were bank deposits or 
perhaps government bonds and the interest rate paid on these forms of savings 
was sharply negative in real terms. Since individuals could not save effectively 
through financial securities, they saved instead through investing in consumer 
durables, housing, other storable commodities (e.g., canned goods), or perhaps 
foreign exchange. The statistics rarely reflected these forms of savings since 
purchase of most of these goods would be reported as consumption while ac- 
quisition of foreign exchange was  often  illegal  and  thus unreported.  These 
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forms of savings do not free resources for productive investment, however." 
In the past, the government  compensated  by  providing  all the financing for 
business investment. 
Substantial new investment is essential for the success of the reform effort. 
Given the budgetary pressures on the government  and the difficulty  of  bor- 
rowing more abroad, it is essential that the reform process create incentives 
for individuals to save through financial assets rather than through consumer 
durables, foreign currency, or  other forms of investment that do not free re- 
sources for new productive investment. This requires a dramatic reduction in 
the effective tax rate on financial savings. To begin with, this requires paying 
nonnegative real interest rates on bank deposits, so that financial assets earn at 
least as high a rate of return as the zero rate of return earned on real commodi- 
ties or foreign currencies.'2 Such a rise in the rate of return on financial assets 
should lead to a one-time jump in financial deposits as well as a continuing 
growth in financial deposits as new savings are invested. In particular, those 
holding foreign currency should quickly be willing to deposit these funds in 
an interest-bearing account, facilitating their productive  investment either at 
home or abroad. Similarly, those holding stockpiles of real commodities would 
have the incentive to sell them off and invest the funds in financial assets. Given 
that much of the savings done previously  showed up in the statistics as con- 
sumption, this change should also lead to a dramatic rise in the reported sav- 
ings rate. In China, for example, reported household savings grew from  1.6 
percent  of  disposable  national  income  in  1978 to  12.0 percent  in  1986,33 
allowing the national  investment rate to remain very high in spite of  a sharp 
fall in the amount of investment financed by the government. 
These gains could easily be undermined if any attempt were made to tax the 
return on financial assets. Until equity markets develop, financial assets will 
primarily be interest-bearing securities and bank deposits. Given the high in- 
flation rates in these countries, even minor tax rates can quickly cause after- 
tax interest rates to be negative. In addition to inducing individuals to invest in 
the types of  untaxed assets used previously, such taxation would now also in- 
duce individuals to circumvent the banking system by lending directly to pri- 
vate  At times, this may be appropriate because individuals sometimes 
have better information than banks about the likely success of some firms or 
because the banking system is reluctant in general to lend to private firms.35  In 
31. Another alternative available to individuals was to send savings to relatives abroad who 
could then invest in foreign financial securities. This allowed the individuals to earn a real return 
on their savings but also did not finance investment at home. 
32. To  the extent that  individuals can invest  abroad in foreign bank accounts, domestic rates 
would have to he competitive with those paid abroad. 
33. For further details, see Naughton (1988). 
34. Such loans would very  likely avoid taxation, owing to the difficulty that  the  government 
35. To  facilitate these personal loans, modifications in contract law  may also he needed, to 
would face in monitoring them. 
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most cases, however, these direct loans to businesses are less well informed 
and more costly to negotiate than bank loans-banks  are valuable financial 
intermediaries.  It is therefore important  to avoid financial disintermediation 
through imposing taxes on financial assets. Given the high efficiency and ad- 
ministrative costs of taxes on financial assets, they should be avoided, at least 
for the immediate future. 
9.4.4  What about Border Taxes? 
One other source of  revenue that is also much more important among the 
East European countries than among OECD countries is trade taxes. Political 
pressures for tariff protection have been strong. Given the need for additional 
tax revenue, can a case be made for tariffs on these grounds alone? 
The simple answer from the public finance literature is no.36  In a small open 
economy, an optimal tax structure should not distort trade patterns. As argued 
above, however, taxes on domestic production in themselves distort trade pat- 
terns to the extent that they distort relative  prices of  domestically  produced 
versus foreign-produced goods. For example, taxing domestic manufacturing 
but not domestic agriculture encourages exports of agricultural goods and irn- 
ports of manufactured  goods. These distortions can be offset, however, by  a 
counterbalancing tariff on imports that is set to equal in size the tax on domes- 
tic production, good by good, and a subsidy on exports of each good that im- 
plicitly rebates the domestic tax on that good. These counterbalancing  taxes 
and rebates are a basic part of a value-added tax. Eliminating trade distortions 
under other tax systems is more complex and will likely violate GATT rules. 
9.5  Other Tax Reform Issues in Eastern Europe during the Transition 
This discussion of tax policy has made little mention of the enormous trans- 
formation that these economies are undergoing. What complications does this 
transformation process create for fiscal policy? The models used to justify the 
types of tax policy outlined above presume that the economy would operate 
efficiently  were it not for tax-induced distortions.  But there are likely to be 
important market failures affecting each step in the process of economic trans- 
formation. The first key requirement  of a successful transformation,  for ex- 
ample, is the entry of large numbers of new firms. But the success or failure of 
a new firm provides important information to other potential entrants, implying 
inadequate incentives for new entry.” These firms also likely face credit con- 
straints since banks cannot tell  legitimate from fraudulent  new entrants and 
may prefer lending to established firms in any case. The second key require- 
ment of the economic transformation is that existing inefficient firms need to 
36. For a recent reference, see Gordon and Levinsohn (I  990). 
37. This is just a variant of the arguments concerning incentives for research-and-development 
activity. The recent endogenous-growth literature (e.g., Romer 1986; and Lucas 1988)  argues that 
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be shut down. But there is a large literature pointing  out ways in which the 
incentives faced by firms near or in bankruptcy can be badly distorted. Third, 
workers leaving inefficient firms and searching for employment in new firms 
likely face spells of unemployment in between. Again, there is a large litera- 
ture describing how incentives faced in employment are distorted. 
All these distortions  exist to some degree in OECD countries  as well. In 
cases where corrective policies have developed to lessen the distortions, the 
problem is simply to import these policies into East Europe. More commonly, 
however, these distortions remain uncorrected  but are of minor consequence 
since these economies have been very stable and distortions affecting the entry 
and exit of firms therefore do not affect much the economies’ overall perfor- 
mance.  In Eastern  Europe, however, these distortions  can  in principle  have 
major effects on the transformation process. In this section, I explore to what 
degree a case can be made for some further fiscal intervention to lessen these 
costs. 
9.5.1  Positive Externalities Generated by New Businesses 
During the transformation  process, there will inevitably be major changes 
in the types of goods produced; the technology used to produce them; the size, 
location, and internal organization of and incentive schemes used by the firms; 
the means used for marketing goods; the nature of interfirm contractual rela- 
tions; the means used for financing firms; etc. No one is yet in a position to 
describe clearly how these economies will look a few years from now. Invest- 
ors face a  strong  incentive to wait  until  more  is known  before  committing 
their funds to any particular project, hoping to learn from the experience of 
others what works and what does not. But this learning is a form of externality 
generated  by  the initial entrants. If  a firm succeeds, others will quickly  try 
to imitate those aspects of  the firm that  worked best; if  it fails, others will 
know better what to avoid. Given that virtually nothing is yet known concern- 
ing the future design of these economies, every new firm is in effect an experi- 
ment. 
In theory, the right response is to subsidize whatever specifically is generat- 
ing an externality. Since there is uncertainty concerning the appropriate design 
of virtually every aspect of these firms, however, it is difficult to pinpoint a 
specific action generating externalities. Inevitably, much of the experimenta- 
tion will be done by small new firms that initially invest little in order to “test 
the waters”  before investing further. Changes by existing firms are likely to 
be much more limited. Replacing old technology with newer but well-tested 
imported technology, for example, should not generate much information of 
use to others. 
This suggests some form of subsidy limited to new firms, the reverse of the 
favoritism  traditionally  shown for state firms. But what form should such a 
subsidy  take? Many  developing  countries  have  adopted  tax  holidays,  under 
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years of operation.'* This tax exemption often has little direct value, however, 
since new firms normally have little or no net income during their first few 
years of operation. As shown in Mintz (1990), its value can also vary dramati- 
cally depending on detailed aspects of  the tax law, for example, whether loss 
carry-forwards are allowed, making it very difficult to set the desired subsidy 
rate.79  The size of the subsidy depends on the capital intensity of the firm. 
Yet the size of the externality need not be closely related to capital intensity. 
An alternative that is neutral with respect to a firm's capital intensity would be 
to subsidize firms on the basis of their value added during the first few years 
of operation. This cannot be done simply by assigning a firm a lower VAT rate 
during its first few years in operation, h~wever.~"  In addition, when a firm's tax 
rate changes over time, timing of deductions becomes important, whereas this 
timing can be ignored when the rate remains constant over time. For example, 
allowing expensing of capital investment at the initial low VAT  rate and then 
taxing the later income generated by this capital at high rates discourages new 
investment, contrary to the intent of the subsidy. An effective subsidy would 
spread these deductions over time to correspond in timing to the income gener- 
ated from these  expenditure^.^' 
Foreign subsidiaries may generate particularly large externalities since they 
can introduce local managers to information about the internal operations of 
successful foreign firms. In addition, they provide externalities to other poten- 
tial foreign investors, who may wait to observe the outcome from earlier for- 
eign investments before committing their own funds. The argument for subsi- 
dizing also applies to foreign subsidiaries. 
The size of externalities should diminish over time, as the economy reaches 
a new equilibrium, since in a stable economy less would be learned from new 
entrants.  As a result,  any  subsidies  based  on these externalities  would  also 
diminish rapidly over time. This declining subsidy gives firms an incentive to 
enter sooner rather  than later, as desired.  The effect will be  stronger if  the 
declining time pattern of the subsidy rate is agreed to in the initial legislation. 
Even in a stable economy, some case can be made for such subsidies. To 
some degree, they do exist even under U.S. tax legislation. Certainly there are 
38. For a summary of these tax provisions and a discussion of the incentives created by  these 
holidays, see Mintz (1990). 
39. One problem that exists with any such subsidy scheme is that firms not qualifying for the 
subsidy have the incentive to shut down and then reopen or to open new subsidiaries in order to 
qualify for the subsidy. Administrative rules might be used to limit this abuse, e.g.,  limiting the 
fraction of capital or labor in a new firm that comes from any given existing firm. 
40.  Doing so results in a rebate of the value-added taxes paid at a higher rate on the inputs it 
purchases, in which case the subsidy is tied to the firm's gross sales to final consumers rather than 
its value added. Similarly, a lower VAT  rate provides a subsidy for output sold domestically but 
not for output that is exported, which again seems inappropriate. 
41. One mechanism to spread out these deductions is to grant a deduction each year equal to 
the market interest rate times the historical cost of the capital in use. If  tax rates were to remain 
constant over time, this is equivalent in present value to allowing expensing. Inflation still leads 
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tax incentives for research and development. But, in addition, small firms and 
noncorporate firms face lower tax rates.42  New entrepreneurs  also receive an 
important part of their compensation in the form of capital gains on the value 
of  their business, and these capital gains have also been subject to favorable 
tax treatment. 
If  externalities  generated  by  new  firms  are not  adequately  internalized 
through subsidies, then any policy that affects the rate of entry of new firms 
should take into account the welfare consequences of this effect. For example, 
selling off state firms reduces the amount of funds that investors have available 
to start up new private businesses. If new businesses generate greater externali- 
ties than do state firms after privatization, as seems likely, then this crowding 
out imposes important social costs4’ 
9.5.2  Credit Constraints 
The entry of new firms in these countries has been quite limited so far, in 
part because credit has been very difficult to obtain. To some degree, the bank- 
ing system has simply continued to focus on the large state firms with whom 
it has had a working relationship for many years. The problems are more basic, 
however. New firms have no track record to use to demonstrate their creditwor- 
thiness, and new owners may have few personal assets to pledge as collateral.a 
Some of the potential borrowers may also be fraudulent, simply intending to 
disappear with the borrowed funds. Given banks’ limited ability to screen loan 
applicants, they may rationally anticipate receiving a below-market rate of re- 
turn on loans to new firms. The social rate of return on such loans can be much 
higher,  however,  since the funds lost to fraudulent  borrowers from a social 
perspective are a transfer rather than a waste of resources. 
Even if banks could successfully screen out all fraudulent borrowers, there 
may still be too little lending to new firms. Even if the expected economic rate 
of return on the invested funds at least equals the opportunity cost of funds, 
for example, the return to the bank can be much lower since it bears all the 
losses on bad projects that default but receives only the interest rate on projects 
that succeed. Without asymmetric information, equity financing would not be 
subject to this problem. But equity markets do not yet exist in these countries. 
Asymmetric information problems are far less important with existing firms, 
since the past experience of the firms provides substantial information about 
their viability. From a social perspective, there will therefore be too little lend- 
ing to new firms relative to existing firms. But how can policy be used to in- 
crease credit allocations to new firms? One simple approach is simply to re- 
quire that at least some percent of each bank’s lending go to new firms. If the 
42. New  entrants are normally small and normally subject to taxes at noncorporate rates for 
43. For further discussion, see Gordon (1991). 
44. In any case, the law may make it difficult for the bank  to seize these assets in the event 
their first few years in business. 
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banks in fact lose money on these loans, then the result is a higher equilibrium 
interest rate on loans to existing firms and/or a lower rate paid  on deposits. 
Competition  with foreign banks  may limit the banks’ ability to pass on the 
losses on new loans to other customers of the bank. An alternative would be to 
reduce the bank’s tax rate as a function of the fraction of  its loans going to 
new firms. 
Just as asymmetrical  information will limit the amount of credit extended 
by domestic banks to new firms, it will also likely limit the amount of  funds 
invested by foreigners in these countries. Foreigners do not know which firms 
are good risks-they  do not even  know  which  countries  are good risks.  In 
theory, they will invest until  the ex ante marginal return  is the  same as that 
available  elsewhere.  But if  the country  gains at the  margin  from additional 
funds, even given the rate of  return charged on these funds, then  it has the 
incentive to intervene to increase the size of capital imports. Under what condi- 
tions would it gain at the margin? If  foreigners received the economic return 
from their investments, free of tax, and those who sold the assets to the foreign 
investors broke even on the sale, then there is no direct net gain to the country 
from the marginal investment. With asymmetrical  information, however, do- 
mestic sellers may often succeed in selling ‘‘lemons’’ to foreigners and would 
not knowingly undercharge  for assets, so on  average they gain from sales of 
assets to foreigners. In addition, the domestic government gains not only from 
taxes known at the time of  the investment but also perhaps from additional 
taxes enacted in the future. If the country gains at the margin from additional 
capital inflows, the appropriate response is a subsidy to capital inflows chosen 
so that on net the country breaks even on thc marginal capital inflow.45 
Another response to asymmetrical information problems is to redesign the 
tax system so as to leave more funds in the hands of the better informed, who 
face fewer asymmetrical information problems when they invest these funds. 
The better informed are primarily the new private entrepreneurs who by self- 
selection have been willing to commit their time and savings to their new busi- 
nesses. Not only do taxes on these businesses distort marginal incentives, but 
they also worsen the problems created by asymmetrical information by reduc- 
ing the cash holdings of the better informed.46  Making negative tax liabilities 
on tax  losses incurred  during the first few years of  operation of  a business 
refundable, for example, provides an extra source of finance for these firms. 
Another approach is to allow immediate deductions for new investment rather 
than spreading these deductions out over time. A credit-constrained firm  will 
gain from these accelerated deductions even if the present value of the deduc- 
tions is ~nchanged.~’ 
As long as credit constraints remain important, any policies that affect the 
45. For a similar argument, see Doyle and van Wijnbergen (1984). 
46. For further discussion, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989). 
47. An example would be replacing  depreciation with a one-time deduction at the beginning 
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amount of credit going to new businesses must take into account the welfare 
consequences of  this  effect.  For  example,  financing  a  government  deficit 
through borrowing from the banking sector reduces the amount of financing 
that banks can provide to new businesses. This reduction is particularly costly 
if too little was being loaned to new businesses to begin with. 
9.5.3  Distortions to Layoff Decisions 
Inevitably,  during  the  rapid  economic  transformation  in  Eastern  Europe, 
many existing firms will lay off some of their workers. Yet layoff decisions are 
badly distorted, even under the institutions in use in the OECD countries. Poli- 
cies there have evolved over time to lessen these problems, but many distor- 
tions remain. The institutions now being set up in Eastern Europe are likely to 
lead to worse distortions, at least initially. Given the importance of  layoffs dur- 
ing the transition process, any distortions to incentives are of concern. 
Even ignoring unemployment  insurance  programs,  there are some distor- 
tions to layoff incentives. When an additional worker is laid off and starts com- 
peting with other unemployed workers for new positions, these workers are 
made worse off since their chances of being hired have been  somewhat re- 
duced; the layoff therefore creates a negative externality. Firms, however, may 
find it slightly easier to till vacancies owing to the larger pool of unemployed 
workers. Unemployment insurance introduces important further distortions. If 
it is financed out of general tax revenues, as it now is in Poland, then it simply 
provides a subsidy to unemployment. As a result, firms are too quick to lay off 
workers and too slow to hire them on efficiency grounds. 
In Eastern Europe, economic transformation  necessarily involves a large- 
scale movement of  workers from inefficient firms and unprofitable industries 
to efficient firms and profitable industries. Yet workers may cling to low-paying 
jobs in existing firms, in spite of  the substantial potential benefits of finding a 
better job elsewhere, because their low savings may be insufficient to tide them 
over until they can find a better job. The “safety net” provided by unemploy- 
ment  insurance  may be  essential  to induce workers to  move  and to induce 
worker-controlled firms to lay off existing workers. 
Given these conflicting pressures, how should an unemployment-insurance 
program be structured? Aid specifically to the unemployed cannot easily be 
defended on redistributional grounds. Whether the tax system taxes consump- 
tion  or income, it would  already attempt to treat the poor more generously 
than the rich. But, given their current income (consumption), why should the 
unemployed be treated better than other individuals with the same current in- 
come (consumption)? Just because of their previous employment, the currently 
unemployed  should be better  off than others with the same current  income 
(consumption). The key problem is that the unemployed may have little sav- 
ings. They cannot plan ahead adequately owing to the unanticipated nature of 
layoffs, they cannot buy insurance ex ante to protect against the financial stress 
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presumed future earnings. These problems arise from adverse selection, com- 
pounded by the primitive nature of the financial sector in these countries. 
The U.S.  unemployment-insurance  program attempts to provide a “safety 
net” to laid-off workers ex post while still not distorting the incentives faced 
for temporary layoffs. In particular, this program taxes each firm on the basis 
of the rate at which benefits have been paid in the past to its workers. In equilib- 
rium, the firm basically ends up paying the unemployment-insurance benefits 
of its former workers while competition in the labor market implies that the ex 
ante costs are passed on to workers through a wage reduction to reflect their 
expected future unemployment  benefits. In principle,  therefore, the program 
corresponds to an insurance policy.J8  If the program provides full insurance to 
workers, then the firm faces roughly correct incentives when deciding whether 
to lay off or rehire a worker-the  firm bears all the financial implications of 
its decisions, and workers are fully insured against the implications of these 
decisions.49 Workers,  however, have an incentive to remain unemployed too 
long since accepting a job means loss of further benefits. Since firms make 
rehire decisions, this distortion is unimportant with temporary  layoffs but is 
important if the layoffs are permanent. 
The U.S. program was designed in a setting where most layoffs are tempo- 
rary. But this will not be the case during the next few years in Eastern Europe, 
where most of the firms laying off workers will be in the process of shutting 
down. These workers will have an incentive to search too long for new employ- 
ment. In addition, since a U.S.-style  system does not attempt to tax a firm’s 
residual assets for the cost of the unemployment benefits received by the firm’s 
former workers, failing firms do not bear the cost of the unemployment benefits 
received  by  their  former workers,  and  firms  will  therefore  shut  down too 
quickly.50 
If an unemployment-insurance  program were financed out of general reve- 
nues, as in Poland, then even temporary layoff incentives would be distorted. 
The program simply subsidizes unemployment,  encouraging  firms to lay off 
workers and discouraging new firms from hiring them-the  only way an indi- 
vidual can receive these benefits is to be unemployed. Paying for the program 
through general taxes in addition exacerbates the distortions created by these 
general taxes. 
An alternative design for a “safety net” would be to lend money to the unem- 
ployed. Government loans to the unemployed avoid the adverse selection prob- 
lem faced by private lenders since the government would be lending to all the 
48. In practice, however, the link between taxes and future expected benefits is hardly complete. 
One problem emphasized by Feldstein (1974) is that there are maximum and minimum tax rates: 
firms at these constraints pay nothing at the margin when they lay off an extra worker. For further 
discussion, see Brown (1981). 
49. For a formal presentation of this story, see Baily (1978). 
50. This distortion is compounded by the fact that employed workers face high social insurance 
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unemployed.  These loans provide the liquidity that workers may need to be 
willing to quit and search for a better job, hastening the transition. As long as 
the loans are repaid by the worker in the future, there are no resulting distor- 
tions to incentives5]  These loans would be appropriate whenever borrowing 
constraints seem to be important. Laid-off workers would normally face bind- 
ing borrowing constraints, but so would workers who had previously been self- 
employed who choose to look for a different job. A good example would be 
Polish farmers driven out of  business by  cheap imports. One administrative 
way  to run  such a program would be to tax the firm hiring  an unemployed 
worker for the past benefits paid to this unemployed worker. The firm would 
in equilibrium pass on these costs to the new employee either through reduced 
wages or through explicit payments to compensate for the costs imposed on 
the  firm.s2 The change  from a U.S.  program  appears  small-in  the United 
States, the firm that lays off a worker rather than the firm hiring a worker is 
taxed on the basis of the benefits received by this worker-yet  the differences 
in incentives can be very important.s3 
There will still be a moral hazard problem.  Individuals may accept these 
loans even though they have no intention of finding future employment and 
thus have no prospect of repaying the loan. Conditions on eligibility (e.g., past 
commitment to the labor force or limits on length of eligibility) could well be 
appropriate to limit the problems. Although some individuals would still re- 
ceive loans without repaying  them, the incentives are better than  under the 
existing Polish program, where no individuals pay back the loans they receive. 
9.5.4  Distortions Affecting Bankruptcy Decisions 
When firms are on the verge of  bankruptcy, their incentives can be badly 
distorted. Managers in principle act in the interests of a controlling subset of 
creditors, be they the equity holders in Western firms or the firm’s workers in 
East European state enterprises. When a firm is not near bankruptcy, actions in 
the interest of a controlling subset of creditors should also be in the interest of 
creditors as a whole since these outside creditors would continue to be repaid 
in full. Near bankruptcy, however, any actions that increase the risk of bank- 
ruptcy or reduce the value of the assets left given bankruptcy will harm outside 
51. This still leaves a lack of insurance, ex ante, for the losses that result from being unem- 
ployed. The loss should be small relative to lifetime income, however, so that the gain from insur- 
ance is likely to be much less important than the gain from relaxed borrowing constraints. 
52. Given the possibility of future quits and layoffs, a firm will be under competitive pressure 
to pass on immediately to that worker any taxes that it pays.  As a result, these taxes should be 
spread over time, to allow the credit-constrained worker to maintain a smooth consumption path. 
If the worker does leave the new firm,  any remaining liabilities should be transferred to the follow- 
ing employer. 
53. Administration of the program becomes more complicated, however, since the net payments 
to each worker must be kept track of, rather than simply the net payments to workers from each 
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creditors. Yet  managers have no reason to take this harm into account in their 
decision making, leading to the possibility of inefficient decisions.54 
One way  to limit  the importance  of these adverse incentives would  be to 
limit the debt that state firms carry with them into the transition period, particu- 
larly when they are privatized. In principle, eliminating a given amount of debt 
from the balance sheet of a state firm should induce investors to pay that much 
more for the firm. In fact, the increase in the sales price for the firm may be 
more than enough to cover the cost of the debt assumed by  the government 
since the reduced  risk of  bankruptcy  is valuable to those who purchase  the 
firm. 
9.6  Conclusions 
Prior to the economic reforms,  the tax systems in use in Eastern  Europe 
served primarily just an accounting role. The allocation of resources was deter- 
mined in large part through negotiations between firms and the planning minis- 
tries. Income distribution was determined in large part through direct govern- 
ment controls over wages, prices, and the supply of  consumer goods rather 
than through the tax law. Serving simply this accounting role, the tax law could 
and did  end up taking  a form completely  incompatible  with  the successful 
operation of a market economy. 
Under  the reforms,  governments in Eastern  Europe are faced with  many 
pressing expenditure needs, ranging from heavy investment demands for firm 
restructuring  and improved  infrastructure to social insurance benefits for the 
newly unemployed. Yet the existing tax system already has very high tax rates, 
making it very difficult and costly to raise further taxes to finance these needed 
expenditures. In addition, the tax base has been shrinking both because firms 
now have the ability to alter their decisions so as to reduce their tax liabilities 
and because inflation causes a drop in the tax base due primarily to the deduct- 
ibility of nominal interest payments from some approximation of real income. 
As a result, tax reform is essential. Since this reform must occur quickly if 
large misallocations and large deficits are to be avoided, proposed alternative 
tax systems must be simple and quick to implement. One alternative for both 
the current turnover tax and the current business income-tax is a tax on each 
firm’s real value added. This alternative tax would result in a much broader tax 
base and would be easy to implement and easier to administer than the existing 
tax system. 
Revenue needs are only one of the problems that will be faced by  fiscal 
policy during the economic transformation  in Eastern Europe, however. This 
economic transformation will inevitably be a long and difficult process. This 
is true in part because there are many market failures inhibiting the speed of 
each step of  this transformation.  The first key  requirement  of  a successful 
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transformation, for example, is the entry of large numbers of new firms. But 
new firms are likely to face severe credit constraints and are likely to generate 
important  information  spillovers of value to other potential entrants,  on  net 
resulting in too slow a rate of  entry of new firms on efficiency grounds. The 
second key requirement of the economic transformation is that existing ineffi- 
cient firms need to be shut down. But there is a large literature pointing out 
ways in which the incentives faced by firms near or in bankruptcy can be badly 
distorted, resulting in misinvestment and too slow a rate of exit. Third, workers 
leaving inefficient firms and searching for employment in new firms likely face 
spells of unemployment in between. While some form of unemployment insur- 
ance is essential to facilitate this movement of workers, existing programs pro- 
vide a large subsidy to becoming and remaining unemployed, resulting in an 
excessive rate of unemployment. 
These distortions exist to some extent in all economies but are particularly 
important in Eastern Europe given the rapid rate of firm entry and exit that 
needs to occur there and the great uncertainty that exists now concerning the 
future  design  of  these  economies. As a result,  there  are strong  economic 
grounds for further fiscal intervention. Given the presumption that the rate of 
entry of new firms and the rate of exit of existing firms will be inadequate, that 
resources will be used poorly by failing firms, and that the unemployment rate 
will be too high, based on efficiency criteria, any policies that move these deci- 
sions in the desired direction  should take these benefits into account. Some 
possible approaches are suggested in the paper. Any such interventions must 
be designed with great care, however, given the potential for the old planning 
ministries to reassert their control over the allocation of resources. 
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Comment  Barry Bosworth 
Roger Gordon’s paper is very useful in providing some sensible advice, gained 
from the experience of  OECD countries, on the primary measures that East 
European countries will need to take to establish viable tax systems to support 
public expenditures. I fully agree with his analysis of the potential large bene- 
fits from moving as quickly as possible to convert the turnover tax to a value- 
added tax and reducing the degree of reliance on the business profits tax, re- 
structuring it as a cash-flow tax. However, I am bothered by some of  the more 67  Fiscal Policy during the Transition in Eastern Europe 
minor themes of the paper. In addition, I feel that it is mistitled since it really 
emphasizes issues of taxation with very little discussion of the pressures that 
these countries will face from the expenditure side. 
First, the need to adopt a long-term horizon for fiscal policy that considers 
the costs of unfunded future liabilities has been a popular theme in the policy 
debate of the industrialized countries in recent years. Translating that discus- 
sion into a recommendation  that economies in transition  move away from a 
focus on the  cash-flow  budget  to  a concept  of  balancing  the  budget  on a 
present-value basis seems to me to be a serious mistake. Basing current policy 
on projections  of tax  revenues  and  expenditures  several years  in the  future 
seems foolhardy given the uncertainty of the economic environment in which 
they are operating. Plus, as we know from our own experience, budget projec- 
tions are subject to enormous political manipulation.  Furthermore,  I would 
encourage  these countries  to avoid reliance  on foreign  indebtedness  in  the 
early  stages of  reform  when  it  is  difficult  to  instill  the  discipline  needed 
to ensure repayment.  Grants are always good, and these countries definitely 
need trade credits and foreign equity investments; but there are already ex- 
cessive political pressures to use foreign debt to finance government consump- 
tion. 
Second, I would be less opposed than Gordon to the introduction of a per- 
sonal income tax. While the value-added and business cash-flow taxes should 
be the primary revenue sources, small business, the self-employed, and agricul- 
ture are essentially untaxed under his scheme. On the basis of the experience 
in Poland, they become a significant portion of total employment within a short 
time period. Plus, there will be a need for some method of introducing a pro- 
gressive tax somewhere in the system. There are various means of taxing agri- 
culture, the most efficient being to rely on a presumptive tax on agricultural 
land. 
Third, given the fiscal pressures that these countries face in the early stages 
of the transition, I do not share Gordon’s opposition to tariffs as long as the 
number of rates is very limited and maintained in the range of 10-20  percent. 
One could easily make infant-industry-type arguments for a transitional period 
of  tariff protection. It is a very simple tax to collect, and the administrative 
structure is already in place. 
Fourth, while I would agree with Gordon that inflation can lead to severe 
distortions with an unindexed corporate profits tax, he may give too much em- 
phasis to inflation in explaining what happened in Poland in 1990-91.  I would 
have liked to see some analysis of the extent to which the gap between account- 
ing profits and economic profits accounted for the swing in corporate tax reve- 
nue versus changes in the rate of  economic profit itself. I thought that eco- 
nomic profits went up in the early months of 1990 as firms with considerable 
market power raised prices and cut output, holding on to the profits because of 
enormous uncertainty. As the year progressed, they began to pay out the profits 
in the form of large wage increases. By early 1991, the economic rate of profit 68  Roger H. Gordon 
was low because of weak advocacy for a return to capital and because the real 
rate of interest was highly positive. 
Fifth, I believe that the subsidy for new businesses is precisely the sort of 
cute fiscal program that  should be avoided. It would  be  subject to potential 
abuse without a very strong tax administration system, something that is cer- 
tain to be in short supply. If the problem is a bias in the allocation of credit 
between new and existing firms, it should be dealt with directly in the design 
and supervision of the financial system, rather than indirectly through a tax 
subsidy that is only loosely related to credit needs. 
Finally, I think that Gordon’s suggestion of a loan program for the unem- 
ployed in which employers would  be taxed for the previous unemployment- 
insurance payments to a new hire is not practical. Given the starting point of 
the near absence of a functioning labor market, I would prefer to emphasize 
the  positive aspects of  an  unemployment-insurance  system of  encouraging 
workers to move and to promote necessary layoffs in firms with excess workers 
and  weak  management  control. These countries  would  be better  advised  to 
establish an unemployment-insurance  system, similar to that of Western Eu- 
rope, with a focus on a low insurance payment and a conversion of the long- 
term unemployed  into a general means-tested  welfare program. I agree that 
there are distortions of the type that Gordon mentions, but these countries have 
limited  administrative  resources,  they  cannot  afford  experiments,  and  they 
should focus their attention on the big problems. 
Discussion Summary 
Kemal Dewij said that  domestic borrowing  had been overlooked as an im- 
portant source of  government finance. He felt that domestic borrowing could 
be particularly  successful  in Poland  and Hungary.  Attracting  private  saving 
would reduce the need for monetary financing, helping stabilize the inflation 
rate. 
Geoffrey Curliner addressed Bosworth’s criticism of government programs 
that provide credit to new firms. Carliner said that, even though programs like 
the Small Business Administration may have been a failure in the West, such 
programs  might be useful  in  Eastern  Europe. Banks in Eastern  Europe are 
closely tied to big state enterprises, and these banks have little experience in 
analyzing the creditworthiness of new firms. As a result, new firms do not have 
access to formal credit. 
Simon Johnson cited survey evidence that suggests that many new firms do 
have access to credit but that they choose not to borrow because of high nomi- 
nal  interest  rates. Johnson  agreed  with  Bosworth that tax  holidays  generate 
gaming:  firms  close  down  and  reregister  in  sectors where  tax  breaks  are 
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Jan Winiecki also criticized tax  holidays.  He warned  that a three-year tax 
holiday for new firms would be very costly since such a holiday would effec- 
tively rule out tax revenue from the private sector. As an alternative to tax 
holidays,  he favored the proposal that new  firms be able to write off invest- 
ment immediately. 
Jacek Rostowski  supported  Gordon’s recommendation  that East European 
governments  should emphasize indirect  taxes like wage  taxes and the VAT. 
However, Rostowski said that too much stress was being put on changing the 
tax system and not enough on the question of administration.  He noted that 
Poland already has a tax system that is like a VAT, so it really does not matter 
that a pure VAT  has not been introduced. He said that getting people to pay, 
particularly people in the private sector, is the real problem. 
Olivier Blanchard agreed with Gordon’s resistance to rapid development of 
an income tax. Blanchard noted that, because of the complexity of  income tax 
administration, such taxes should be implemented only if the government feels 
a strong need to make the tax system more progressive. He believes that this is 
not a short-term priority. 
Pentti Kouri said that the public sector in Russia has a substantial asset base 
and  low debt and should  therefore be  able to borrow  abroad. Jeflrey Sachs 
added that the Russian government could raise “significant amounts” by issu- 
ing deutsche-mark-denominated  notes at an interest rate 2 percentage points 
higher than the German rate. 
Sweder van Wijnbergen felt that Gordon’s paper did not devote enough atten- 
tion to the issues of tax administration and the associated implications for tax 
structure. Wijnbergen said that it takes time to build an effective administrative 
system, even in relatively  sophisticated countries like Turkey. He concluded 
that, over the short run, the government will need to rely on “easy” taxes, like 
the VAT  and temporary tariffs. 
Wijnbergen noted that temporary tariffs are also useful because of their ef- 
fect on the balance of trade. At least for the short run, the East European coun- 
tries will not have access to Western credit markets and therefore will not be 
able to run large trade deficits. He said that tariffs will make it easier to sustain 
balanced trade. Dani Rodrik added that tariff  policy is one of the few areas 
in which gradualism-in  this case, phasing out tariffs slowly-is  better than 
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